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The Rise and Downfall of Cassandra: World War I and Vladimir 
(Ze'ev) Jabotinsky's Self-Perception1
In his 1912 article "A Horoscope" Vladimir (Ze'ev) Jabotinsky described the 
hypothetical circumstances for the outbreak of the next world war, which 
previsioned the eruption of the actual war in 1914. The success of that 
prognosis incepted the formation of Jabotinsly's self-image as a prophet, 
which he and his admirers maintained during his career. But his prophetic 
confidence often disrupted his ability to see the events around him outside of 
his political paradigm and created significant blind-spots in the scope of his 
political vision. The essay attempts to pinpoint the genealogy of the 
development of Jabotinsky's self-image as a prophet and to underscore the 
circumstances of World War I that enabled its emergence. I am interested in 
the dynamics of the relationship between personal mythology and history, 
and more particularly in the circular dependency between the understanding 
of one's past and patterns of self-perception and behaviour in the present.
1912 beschrieb Vladimir (Ze'ev) Jabotinsky in seinem Aufsatz “Ein Horoskop” 
die hypothetischen Umstände des Ausbruchs des nächsten Weltkriegs, was 
sich als Vorhersage des realen Kriegs erweisen sollte. Der Erfolg dieser 
Prognose verstärkte die Herausbildung von Jabotinskys Selbstbild als 
Prophet, das er und seine Bewunderer pflegten. Doch sein prophetisches 
Selbstvertrauen hinderte ihn oftmals daran, die Ereignisse unabhängig von 
seinen politischen Paradigmen zu bewerten und führte im Kern seiner 
politischen Vision zu blinden Flecken. Der Essay will die Genealogie von 
Jabotinskys Selbstbild als Prophet im Kontext des Ersten Weltkriegs 
bestimmen, der sein Hervortreten ermöglichte. Es wird die Dynamik 
zwischen der persönlichen Mythologie und der Geschichte herausgearbeitet. 
Dabei wird  insbesondere die Abhängigkeit zwischen dem Verständnis der 
persönlichen Vergangenheit und den Mustern der Selbstwahrnehmung und 
des Verhaltens in der Gegenwart betrachtet.
1 I am grateful to Minerva Foundation (Max Plank Society) for a generous support during the work on this article. My 
special gratitude is given to editors and anonymous reviewer for insightful remarks and suggestions.
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In the winter of 1922, in the midst of the Zionist campaign for the formulation of the
Mandate  for  Palestine  in  the  spirit  of  the  Balfour  declaration,  the  future  founder  of
Revisionist  Zionism2 Vladimir  (Ze'ev)  Jabotinsky  wrote  to  the  president  of  the  World
Zionist  Organization  and  his  then friend  Chaim  Weizmann:  "If  you  are  depressed,  I
strongly advise you to trust my gut feeling. You know that I am close to Cassandra. Even
now I worry for Jerusalem. But I believe in London [British government, S.N.] as in the
rock mountain."3 Later in his career Jabotinsky used the reference to Cassandra again to
highlight  his  own  prophetic  abilities  as  compared  to  the  short-sightedness  of  his
opponents and their refusal to recognize the truth when they heard it.4 He employed an
image of the tragic heroine of the Greek mythology who was given the gift of prophecy by
the god Apollo, but condemned by him not to be believed.5 Through the self-identification
with the legendary Cassandra Jabotinsky positioned himself as a tragic prophet destined
not  to  be  trusted  or  understood  by  his  contemporaries.  This  prophetic  mode
characterized  many of  Jabotinsky's  analyses  of  political  reality  during  his  career  as  a
leader of Revisionist Zionism. Ya'acov Shavit and Liat Shteir-Livny emphasized the tragic
disparity that emerged in the 1930s between his confident prophetic rhetoric and his fatal
failure  to  see  the  real  dangers  of  the  Nazi  regime.6 One  of  the  most  representative
instances of this disparity can be seen in his 1935 article "Nevios af Morgen" (Prophecies
for tomorrow), where he claimed that prophecy-making is a dangerous occupation and
immediately declared that according to his prophecy there would be "no European war in
the future, no half-war and no quarter-war."7 Jabotinsky was not the only one who failed
to foresee the outbreak of the World War II and its catastrophic consequences, but, as
Shavit and Shteir-Livny convincingly argue, his case is especially intriguing against the
backdrop of his overwhelming confidence in his ability to predict upcoming events and
the ardent belief of his followers in his prophetic powers.8
Here, I would like to pinpoint the genealogy of the development of Jabotinsky's self-
image as a prophet and to underscore the circumstances of World War I that enabled its
emergence.  I  am  interested  in  the  dynamics  of  the  relationship  between  personal
mythology and history,  and more particularly in the circular dependency between the
understanding of one's past and patterns of self-perception and behaviour in the present.
2 The Union of Zionists-Revisionists was founded in Paris in1925. Jabotinsky was the animating power behind the inception
of this movement and remained its undisputable leader until his death in 1940. Among the main tenets of this movement 
were the valorization of political and diplomatic mobilization over the economic Gegenwartsarbeit, preference of capitalist 
economy over the socialism, and national sentiments over the class consciousness. For more on Revisionist Zionism see: 
Kaplan, Eran: The Jewish Radical Right: Revisionist Zionism and Its Ideological Legacy, Madison 2005; Shavit, Ya'acov: 
Jabotinsky and the Revisionist Movement, 1925-1948, London 1988; Schechtman, Joseph / Benari, Yehuda: History of the 
Revisionist Movement, Tel Aviv 1970. 
3 Jabotinsky, Vladimir to Chaim Weizmann, 25 February1922, in: Jabotinsky, Ze'ev: Igrot 1918–1922, Jerusalem 1997, p. 292. 
Original in Russian.
4 Jabotinsky, Vladimir: About Cassandra, in: The Zionist. A Revisionist Fortnightly (1), 17 September 1926, p. 57–59. The 
article, originally published in German, exists in Russian, French, Spanish, and Hebrew translations.
5 Cassandra, in: Encyclopaedia Britannica. 2015. online http://academic.eb.com/EBchecked/topic/98088/Cassandra 
(18.11.2015).
6 Shavit, Ya'acov / Shteir-Livny, Liat: Mi kara ze'ev? Eikh hevin Ze'ev Jabotinsky et tiva shel Germania ha-Nazit ve et 
kavanoteiha?, in: Bareli, Avi/Ginosar, Pinkhas(Eds.): Ish Ba-sa'ar. Masot U-mekhkarim al Vladimir Jabotinsky, Beer-Sheva 
2004, p. 345–369. For French translation of the article see: Shavit, Ya'acov / Steir-Livny, Liat : "Qui Criait au loup? Comment 
Zeev Jabotinsky percut-il l’Allemagne nazie et son projet", Revue d’histoire de la Shoah 182 (2005), p. 67–93.
7 Jabotinsky, Vladimir: Nevios af Morgen, in: Der Moment, 11 October 1935, p. 5. Original in Yiddish.
8 Shavit / Shteir-Livny , Mi kara ze'ev?, p. 347.
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The starting point in the history of the formation of Jabotinsky's prophetic stance in
the context of World War I goes back to January 1, 1912. On the first day of the New Year,
he  published  an  article  in  the  local  Odessa  newspaper  "Odesskie  Novosti"  entitled  "A
Horoscope," in which he dared to foretell upcoming events. As of the outset of the article
he proclaimed: 
"First of all, in the forefront of the events to pass in Europe is the great war. That
war  of  which  the  world  is  so  frightened,  and  which,  at  the  same  time,  it  is
expecting  with such morbid,  painful  curiosity.  A  war in  the  centre  of  Europe,
between two or more first-rate civilized powers armed to the teeth with all the
grandiose madness of present day technical equipment, with the involvement of
ground-,  sea-,  undersea-,  and  aerial  forces,  with  an  incredible  number  of
casualties,  and such money losses,  direct,  indirect,  and reflected,  one gets the
impression there will not be enough figures in arithmetic to count them all. This
war  will  break  out  between  England  and  Germany.  […]  Usually,  when  a  man
predicts war, he is made fun of: easy, isn't it, to play politics sitting in a club, café
or tavern and invent clever moves and combinations between British, French, and
Germans. In this case, however, the situation is reversed: fun can be made only of
somebody  who does  not  see  how  perfectly  obvious  and  inevitable  this  war  is,
which will make the whole surface of the Earth sigh and convulse."9
In his subsequent analysis Jabotinsky wrote about the reasons for the outbreak of war
– the prime one, in his opinion, being the unprecedented might of British imperial power
on the one hand, and the awakening of a unified Germany on the other, which "stretches
her muscles,  feels  fresh, unused forces throbbing within, and wants to measure these
forces  against  the  Ruler  of  the  oceans."  This  perception  reverberated  with  modernist
visions  of  latent  primordial  violence  bubbling below  the surface  of  European society,
waiting to erupt and purify the corrupted material  world. These visions, according to
Modris  Eksteins,  not  only  anticipated  the outbreak  of  the  War,  but  were  part  of  the
cultural  tendencies  that  facilitated  its  occurrence  by  preparing  public  opinion  for  its
enthusiastic reception as a most viable solution for the political and spiritual conflicts of
modernity.1

Jabotinsky's  specific  focus  on  the  redistribution  of  colonial  powers  was  probably
influenced by Italian political discourse of that time. Ever since his three-year stay in Italy
from  1898  to  1901,  during  which  he  studied  at  the  University  of  Rome,  Jabotinsky
frequented  circles  of  Italian  non-conformist,  syndicalist  or  syndicalist-oriented
intellectuals such as political activist Arturo Labriola, philosopher Benedetto Croce, art
critic  Ricciotto  Canudo,  and  economist  Emanuele  Sella.  They  were  not  necessarily
affiliated  to  one  coherent  movement,  but  all  of  them  shared  similar  modernist  anti-
rationalist sentiments including the valorisation of particularistic relativism, intuition,
9 Altalena [V. Jabotinsky]: Goroskop, in: Odesskie Novosti, 1 January 1912, p. 3. Original in Russian, English translation 
according to archival manuscript: Jabotinsky Archive at the Jabotinsky Institute in Israel, T-1912/202/an.
1
 Eksteins, Modris: Rites of Spring. The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age, London 1989, p. 33–73.
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passions,  and  drives  over  universal,  materialistic,  and  rational  considerations  and
values.11 Although their  names were rarely  mentioned in his  writings,  their  ideas  and
terminology frequently appeared in his rhetoric and shaped it to some extent.12 
Syndicalism originated in the 19th century in France and Italy as a sub-stream of the
socialist movement. But by the end of the first decade of the 20th century some Italian
syndicalists adopted nationalist ideas as an important mobilizing vehicle for the masses
and saw colonialist interventionism as the optimal practical expression of these ideas.13 At
about the same time that the Italian campaign for the colonization of Libya was launched,
Jabotinsky as well, probably under the influence of his Italian friends, started to refer to
the issue of colonial expansions. Echoing the arguments of Italian syndicalists, in his 1911
article "Pravo i  Sila"  (Right and Force) Jabotinsky stated that the liberal  human rights
rhetoric serves the existing status quo and prevents new participants from entering the
world's theatre of power. He argued that since all conquests and all instances of power
were and are enacted through mechanisms of forceful coercion, the only logical thing to
do  is  to  accumulate  your  own  power  and  to  fight  for  your  own  prey,  instead  of
succumbing to  a  pacifist  and defeatist  rhetoric  that  only  serves  existing  hegemonies,
which were acquired through exactly the same aggressive and offensive measures their
representatives  were  condemning  now.14 Jabotinsky  extended  a  similar  line  of
argumentation in his  analysis  of  the international  political  conjuncture on the eve  of
World  War I  in  the  abovementioned  article  "A  Horoscope."  This  article  also  reflected
Italian  syndicalist  debates  ranging  from  technological  discourse  glorifying  the
introduction of new battlefield techniques to general rhetoric about the cathartic power
of  war.  In  terms of  technology  it  is  worth  pointing  out  that  the  first  military  use  of
airplanes  that  Jabotinsky cited  as  a  new  military  arena in future  wars  had only been
introduced for the first time several months earlier by Italian forces during the Libyan
campaign.15 Like Jabotinsky's stance in this article, even when some Italian syndicalists
disapproved of the war as a political solution, they perceived it as "training in violence,
heroism,  and  sacrifice,"  and  "the  school  par  excellence  for  those  virtues  which  are
necessary for greatness."16 
This perception of war as a primeval force that is terrible but revitalizing for nations
and individuals fashioned Jabotinsky's positions and judgments and prepared him for the
actual outbreak of the Great War in August 1914. In Jabotinsky's autobiography the period
before the war was defined as a lingering "on the crossroads."17 He waved between his
work  as  Russian  writer  and journalist,  mainly  in  Odessa  and St.  Petersburg,  and his
Zionist activities, but neither of these preoccupations was truly satisfactory for him. He
11 Sternhell, Zeev: Anti-Enlightenment Tradition, trans. by Maisel, David,  New Haven 2010, p. 315–371; Bellamy, Richard: 
Croce, Gramsci, Bobbio and the Italian Political Tradition, Colchester 2014, p. 18–20.  
12 On Jabotinsky's connections with Italian non-conformist circles see: Natkovich, Svetlana: Bein Ananei Zohar. Yetsirato 
shel Vladimir (Ze'ev) Jabotinsky Ba-heksher Ha- evrati, Jerusalem 2015, p. 26–34.ḥ
13 Roberts, David: The Syndicalist Tradition and Italian Fascism, Chapel Hill 1979, p. 47–48; 120–121.
14 Jabotinsky, Vladimir: Pravo I Sila, in: Felietony, St. Petersburg 1913, p. 125–138. Original in Russian.
15 Biddle, Tami Davis: Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare, Princeton 2002, p. 19.
16 Sternhell, Zeev/ Sznajder, Mario/ Asheri, Maia: The Birth of Fascist Ideology. From Cultural Rebellion to Political 
Revolution, trans. by Maisel, David, Princeton 1994, p. 166. 
17 Jabotinsky, Ze'ev: Sipur Iamai, in: Jabotinsky, Eri (ed.): Ketavim. Ze'ev Jabotinsly, vol. Avtobiografia, Jerusalem 1947, p. 82.
Original in Hebrew. For English translation see: Jabotinsky, Vladimir: The Story of My Life, ed. by Horowitz, Brian/ Katsis, 
Leonid, Detroit 2016, p.101. 
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felt  that  the  pettiness  of  the  everyday  life  sucked  him  up  and  prevented  him  from
fulfilling his potential.  But in the summer of 1914,  at  the time of general  turmoil  and
confusion, he found himself rediscovering his path in the reality he had predicted, and
whose  dynamic  and laws  he  understood,  or  at  least  thought  he  did.  As  early  as  that
September 1914 he joined the staff of Russia's leading newspaper "Russkie Vedomosti" as
its war expert and correspondent, and embarked on a long journey into the hottest war
zones.  In  the  next  6  months  he visited  Finland,  Sweden,  Norway,  England,  Holland,
Belgium, France, Spain, Portugal, Morocco, Gibraltar, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, and Italy.
This journey provided him with a unique perspective on the constellation of world powers
and the accumulated Zeitgeist in different corners of the world.18 His encounters with
different facets of reality  and world politics reinforced his confidence in his ability to
analyse and predict historical  processes.  From this privileged position of an informed
mobile  observer  he  was  able  to  identify  the  window  of  opportunity  for  the  Zionist
movement to promote its goals through its affiliation with British war interests. Parallel
to his work as a war correspondent of "Russkie Vedomosti," whose home base, after his
journey across Europe and the Middle East was mainly in London, Jabotinsky immersed
himself into a promotion of the idea of Jewish legions. 
It should be recalled that at the time of the Great War Jews fought on both sides of the
conflict  and  the  Zionist  establishment  jealously  protected  the  neutral  status  of  the
movement. The activity of Jabotinsky and his associates – the likeminded non-conformist
intellectuals  such  as  Chaim  Weizmann  and  Pin as  Rutenberg  –  to  promote  theḥ
organization  of  Jewish  units  in  the  framework  of  British  military  forces  to  fight  for
Palestine elicited a furious reaction from multiple factions inside and outside the Zionist
movement. The members of an unofficial lobby for a Jewish legion were accused of short-
sightedness, betrayal, collaboration with the secret police and international imperialism,
as well as willingness to gamble with Jewish lives. But Jabotinsky remained firm in his
adherence to the idea of the Jewish Legion, despite the personal price he had to pay. His
confidence in his ability to read and interpret reality enabled him to function in these
challenging conditions of total mistrust. Undoubtedly his past record as an expert who
could foretell global processes and developments reinforced his determination to resist
his political opponents. 
And indeed, against all odds, Jabotinsky's and Weizmann's scenario for cooperation
with the British government materialized in a way that exceeded all expectations. The
Balfour  Declaration  promised  the  establishment  of  a  Jewish  national  homeland  in
Palestine, Ottoman rule over the Holy Land was ended, and Jewish military units, created
for  the  first  time  after  hundreds  years  of  Diaspora,  participated  in  the  conquest  of
Palestine.  In 1917 Jabotinsky himself joined the British army and ended the war as an
honorary Lieutenant in the battalion of Royal Fusiliers – a part of the Jewish legion. Only
several short years earlier no one could have imagined that this dream would become a
reality. Unsurprisingly there were few people so popular, authoritative, and admired in all
the  camps  of  the  Zionist  movement  as  Jabotinsky  immediately  after  the  war.  It  was
probably the only time in his career that he was the recipient of a broad consensus. 19 His
18 Ibid., p. 97–138.
19 Golomb, Eliyahu: Ze'ev Jabotinsky Ve-tnuat Ha-gdudim Ha-ivriim, in: Ma'ara ot: Yar on Le-she'elot Mediniyot, Kalkaliot ḥ ḥ
Ve-tsvaiyot (1941) Heshvan-Tevet, p. 6–12; 6–15.
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persona was venerated and people hung on to his every word. Occasionally he expressed
frustration when post-war reality did not unfold according to his expectations, but he saw
this as a mere temporal hindrance on the path toward the inevitable realization of his
vision for the future of the Middle East under British colonial rule. 
In 1922, when he republished the collection of his feuilletons that had originally been
printed in Russian in 1913, he included the article "A Horoscope" in the new edition as
confirmation of his prophetic abilities to identify and decipher the Zeitgeist. 2
 However
this publication, which was later translated into Hebrew, German, and English, included
only half of the original 1912 article. As a matter of fact, in the later publication Jabotinsky
omitted half of the original text. That half included two other prognoses for the upcoming
years. One referred to the future of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the other to the
expected dismantlement of the Ottoman Empire. The latter prognosis was influenced by
Jabotinsky's own experience as a Zionist emissary in the Ottoman Empire in 1909-1910,
during which he formed a critical opinion of the prospects of the Young Turks' political
enterprise, their political vision, and governing abilities. His negative stance toward the
future of the Ottoman Empire was also influenced by the Italian experience in the fight
against the Ottomans in the Libyan war, which he mentioned specifically in the text of "A
Horoscope" in 1912. 
It is noteworthy that later in the same year Jabotinsky returned to his prognosis of an
upcoming  war  in  the  Balkans  in  different  article  that  was  completely  devoted  to  an
analysis  of the national tensions in the peninsula, and the underlying interests of the
great powers that influenced and manipulated them. Jabotinsky posited that theoretically
the events in the Balkans could function as a trigger  for a  pan-European war, but he
himself dismissed the likelihood of this scenario: "The pan-European fire is possible, but
only if one of the great powers consciously desires it. In this case it is unlikely."21 
Thus in 1912 Jabotinsky identified two possible bonfires that could lead to world war:
first,  in  January,  he  predicted  the  war  between  England  and  Germany,  and  then,  in
September he foresaw a conflict between the Balkan nations fighting for independence
and the Ottoman Empire. But he saw these as isolated processes, and did not think that
they could converge into one conflict. This perception may have been an outcome of his
unique positioning relative to political occurrences globally. 
Dan Diner claimed that one's choice of observational stance on historical processes
has a dramatic impact on their understanding. He suggested that the key vantage point
for the comprehension of the entanglements of 20th century history is located on the
eastern edge of Europe, between the Baltic, Black, and Aegean seas. This area was a part
of what has been defined in the Western geopolitical thought at the beginning of the 20th
century as a "pivot of history" – the bigger geographical region in which world's political,
economic,  and  military  interests  intersected  and  converged.22 Diner  situated  his
hypothetic  ideal  observer  on the famous steps  of  Odessa.  This was the representative
vantage  point,  at  once  real  and  metaphorical,  from  which  in  one  sweeping  gaze  the
observer  could  have  embraced  the  mythical,  historic,  economic,  national,  and  geo-
2
 Jabotinsky, Vladimir: Goroskop, in: Felietony, Berlin 1922, p. 262–267.
21 Jabotinsky, Vladimir: Voina, in: Odesskie Novosti 22 September 1912, p. 2. Original in Russian.
22 Mackinder, Halford: The Geographical Pivot of History, The Geographical Journal, 4 (1904), p. 421–437.
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political  perspectives of the area that concentrated both the legendary heritage of the
West and its pragmatic commercial and political interests.23 
Historically, this was exactly the point of view of Jabotinsky, who was aware of the
advantages of his observing position, and probably drew part of his confident prophetic
rhetoric from this awareness.24 But unlike the hypothetical ideal all-seeing observer, the
historical Jabotinsky nevertheless developed a blind spot. When looking at international
processes from the Odessa shores,  he concentrated on naval powers and struggles for
influence over existing or potential colonial territories. At the same time he considered
the distribution of forces in mainland Europe as much more stable. The major bonfire he
overlooked in his overview of potential conflict zones between England, Germany, and
the Balkans was the situation in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.  As the matter  of fact
Jabotinsky's major failure in his 1912 article "A Horoscope" was precisely his inability to
grasp processes within the Austro-Hungary.
In the omitted part of the same article that Jabotinsky and his later biographers used
as proof of his ability to foresee the future,25 he claimed: 
"Austria will not be dismantled. When we read about the endless arguments and
quarrels  between  Czechs  and  Germans,  Poles  and  Russians,  Croatians  and
Italians, we think, from a distance, that all these people dream about is how to
throw off the shackles of their mutual neighbourhood, to shut the door and leave.
But we forget that struggle is one of the forms of unity. The struggle for the same
goal,  especially  a  struggle  for  power,  does  not  disassociate  but  rather  unifies,
connects,  creates  mutual  dependencies,  interweaves  a  myriad  of  common
interests. In Austria everybody knows this perfectly well and no one believes in
dismantlement, just as no one fears dismantlement. The people there repeat the
favourite saying of one of the Habsburgs: Austria erit in ultima – Austria will be
the last, Austria will outlive them all.  In fact everyone in Austria, except maybe
some  Italians  –  loves  Austria,  treasures  its  existence,  and  does  not  want  its
collapse.  In  a  country  that  does  not  acknowledge  state  nationalism,  there  is
nevertheless strong and robust state patriotism. Austria will not be broken apart
because it does not want to be broken apart."26
In the following passages Jabotinsky acknowledged the dangers of Hungarian ultra-
nationalism and separatism, but outlined the expected political and military moves that
would  neutralize  and deactivate  this  threat  to  the  future  prosperity  of  the  Habsburg
Empire.
In 1912 his  optimistic prognosis looked as plausible as the possibility  of an Anglo-
German war or a military conflict in the Balkans. It was influenced by Jabotinsky's stay in
Vienna in 1908, when he delved into the study of national politics under different political
regimes. He was particularly impressed by the policy promoted by the Austrian socialists
23 Diner, Dan: Cataclysms. A History of the Twentieth Century from the Europe's Edge, trans. by Templer, William/ Golb, 
Joel, Madison 2007, p. 6.
24 On Jabotinsky's perception of Odessa as a privileged vantage point for observing world history see: Natkovich, Svetlana: 
Odessa as "Point de Capital": Economics, History, and Time in Odessa Fiction, in: Slavic Review, forthcoming.
25 Jabotinsky, Sipur Iamai, p. 93;Jabotinsky, Story of My Life, p. 107; Schechtman, Joseph: The Jabotinsky Story. Rebel and 
Statesman, New York 1956, p. 198; Katz, Samuel: A Lone Wolf, vol. 1, New York 1996, p. 136.
26Altalena [V. Jabotinsky]: Goroskop, in: Odesskie Novosti, 1 January 1912, p. 3.
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to organize the Austrian political sphere according to the principle of supra-territorial
national autonomies, and saw the idea of a multinational confederation under a liberal
imperial rule as an optimal political model for the future.27 Ironically, in "A Horoscope"
from  1912  he  pointed  to  the  heir  to  throne,  the  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand  and  his
followers  as  supportive  of  this  idea  and  gambled  on their  victory  over  the  separatist
tendencies in the Empire. Despite his obvious mistakes in his calculations of the future,
even  Jabotinsky's  erroneous  prognosis  revealed  his  knowledge,  perceptiveness,  and
striking ability to analyse political affairs. 
I  am  less  interested  in  the  miscalculation  itself  than  in  Jabotinsky's  decision  to
remove it from the representative corpus of writings consciously crafted by him later. He
did not abandon the article in its entirety as he did with most of his journalistic oeuvre,
but  rather  edited  it  and  facilitated  its  translations  and  further  abridged  reprints 28 to
promote  and  fortify  the  image  he  wanted  to  convey.  In  my  opinion  this  was  done
sincerely, as part of Jabotinsky's attempt to present the reader with selections of his work
that best applied to contemporary events in the 1920s. But his editorial decision revealed a
blind spot in his self-comprehension. Instead of perceiving and presenting his figure as
complex, multi-layered, both failing and succeeding, he chose the mythical image of the
prophetic  observer.  In  creating  his  authoritative  persona  he  relied  on  his  past,  but
redacted this very past to confirm certain facets of his heritage.
It is important to mention that in his self-characterizations Jabotinsky systematically
eschewed direct self-identification as a prophet. On the contrary, he made the point that
his interpretations originated solely from a cold, disengaged, and rational analysis of the
events.  However,  even  when he emphasized  the  rational  nature  of  his  prognoses,  he
wrapped them in a "prophetic" lexicon, contextualizing them as prophecies, horoscopes,
or predictions of Cassandra. Even when he was using these terms ironically,  implying
that "one does not have to be a prophet in order to see and calculate…”29 he constructed a
semantic  framework  in  which  his  life  and  writings  should  be  understood  and
contextualized. This duality between his rational self representation on the declarative
level  and  a  fatalistic,  semi-mythical  subtext  was  especially  apparent  in  his
autobiographical writings. For example in his 1928 World War I memoir "The Story of the
Jewish Legion," originally published in Russian, Jabotinsky employed two contradictory
systems of rationalization to describe the epiphany he experienced when he first learned
that Turkey had entered the war. First he presented this revelation as the sole outcome of
logical  analysis,  then  positioned  it  in  the  fatalistic  and  mythical  context,  and  finally
returned to a rationalistic mode:
"That morning in Bordeaux, after reading the damp poster on the wall, I drew the
only logical conclusion possible – and to this day I don't understand why it took
numbers of my friends so many years to reach such a simple conclusion. As I saw
it, the matter was crystal clear: the fate of Jews in Russia, Poland, Galicia, very
27Jabotinsky, Vladimir: Predislovie, in: Springer, Rudolf [Renner, Karl]: Gosudarstvo i Natsia, Odessa 1906, p. 3–7; 
Jabotinsky, Vladimir: Samoupravlenie Natsionalnogo Menshinstva, in: Vestnik Evropy 10–11 (1913) p. 117–138; 131–158. 
Originals in Russian.
28Jabotinsky, Vladimir: Goroskop, in: Felietony, Berlin 1922, p. 262–267 (Russian); Zabotinsky, Zeev: Horoskop, in: 
Feuilletons, Maehr. Ostrau 1930, p. 74–79 (German); Jabotinsky, Zeev. Milḥama Olamit, Hed Yerushalaim 55 (10) (1940), p. 3 
(Hebrew, published posthumously).
29Jabotinsky, Ze'ev: Ha-Milḥama Ha-Ba'a, in: Ha-Mashkif, 14 April 1939, p. 3. Original in Yiddish.
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important  undoubtedly,  was,  if  viewed  in  the  historical  perspective  only,
something temporary as compared to the revolution in Jewish national life which
the dismemberment of Turkey would bring us. 
I  never doubted that once Turkey entered the war,  she would be defeated and
sliced to pieces: here again I am at a loss to understand how anyone could ever
have had any doubts on this subject. It was no guesswork but a matter of cold
statistical calculation. […] Where is the man, whatever his faith, who can honestly
point his finger at a certain date and say, "This is where I saw the light"? Everyone
is born with the germ of his belief somewhere inside his brain, though it may not
manifest itself until old age, or ever. I believe that it was always clear to me – from
birth so to speak – that if ever a war should occur between England and Turkey,
the  right  thing  for  the  Jews  would  be  to  form  a  regiment  of  their  own  and
participate in the conquest of Palestine – although before that day in Bordeaux I
had never thought about it distinctly. As a matter of fact, this idea is very normal
idea  which  would  have  occurred,  under  such  circumstances,  to  any  normal
person; and I claim the title of a fully normal person. In Jewish colloquial parlance
this title is sometimes translated by the expression goyisher kop; if it is true – so
much the worse for us."3
  
Here Jabotinsky leaped from his self-characterization as an ordinary commentator,
obediently following the line of rational reasoning to someone who organically carries the
"germ" of national idea and knows things "instinctively," before the consolidation of the
historical  circumstances  that  produce  them.  He  simultaneously  presented  himself  as
"normal" and unexceptional, and as someone who is more in tune to his inner voice than
his short-sighted colleagues. In a way he represented himself as being exceptional in his
normality,  while  other  people's  refusal  to  accept  his  vision  was  characterized  as
denigrated, abnormal, and stereotypically Jewish.  
Willingly  or  unwillingly  Jabotinsky  became  trapped  in  the  process  of  his  own
mythification, and was torn between his awareness of the historical dimensions of his life
experience on the one hand and his mythical role as a national leader, carrying the "germ"
of  national  destiny,  on  the  other.  Part  of  this  mythification  was  a  product  of  his
popularity  among  the  people,  but  part,  undoubtedly,  was  a  result  of  his  own  self-
fashioning and self-presentation. During the 1920s, when this process of mythification
was further accelerated after the founding of the Revisionist movement, Jabotinsky wrote
to his wife:
"There is one unpleasant thing – I have felt  it  for quite a while and have now
started being really frightened. Even with you I don't feel comfortable speaking
about  it  seriously  –  they  have  started  turning  me  into  a  myth:  "this  man
that…."[unfinished sentence in the original,  S.N.]. Of course the major role was
played by the Legion and Acre [a reference to Jabotinsky's imprisonment because
of his involvement in Jewish self-defense during the anti-Jewish riots in 1920 in
Jerusalem,  S.N.],  but  they  attribute  things  to  me  that  I  didn't  even  do  in  an
indirect way […] Neither my fat body nor my bald head help here [...] Worst of all,
this  myth has begun to be transformed into a legend about a "Duce."  Recently
Weisel  wrote  me  from  Palestine,  rebuking  me,  and  asking  why  I  am
3
 Jabotinsky, Vladimir: The Story of the Jewish Legion, trans. by Samuel Katz, New York 1945, p. 30–31.
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disappointing my friends by refusing to be called the "leader." And I feel that this
is happening more and more. It threatens to become a powerful tool for shifting
public opinion, equal in its strength to the crisis in Palestine: both tools are cheap
and demagogical. I am increasingly more concerned that this will be the factor
that will bring us to "power" (az och un wei) – not a contemplation, not a program,
but panic because of  the failure in Palestine and a stupid legend about a new
miracle-making Rabbi."31
However, despite his awareness of the demagogical aspects of his political mythology,
Jabotinsky continued to fuel the Revisionist mythopoesis in general and his own image-
building as a prophetic leader in particular. In a way his success in understanding and
using the opportunities created by World War I and his refusal, or inability, to cope with
the failures of his analysis, limited the scope of his political perspective. He continued to
duplicate the same political paradigms that motivated his decision-making during World
War I,  inevitably  creating broad areas  of  blind zones  that  led  to  his  major  failure  to
foresee the outbreak of World War II. As I mentioned earlier, following Shavit and Shteir-
Livny, he was not the only one who miscalculated the dimensions of the dangers of the
Nazi  regime,  but  in  his  case  the  tension  between  his  prophetic  confidence  and  his
problematic forecast widened the tragic and ironic gap between reality and ways to grasp
it. The outbreak of World War II and the dynamics of its early development profoundly
undermined Jabotinsky's beliefs on politics, war, but primarily the nature of European
society and culture whose ethos was the cornerstone of his worldview. But even then, in a
time of confusion and disorientation, the paradigms of World War I were Jabotinsky's
only means of framing and comprehending European reality. 
Several months before his death in 1940 he moved to the United States to promote the
organization of  Jewish military  units,  the  only thing he could think of  to  oppose the
looming catastrophe. From the United States he wrote to his wife in bombed-out London:
"If the war will continue there will be a [Jewish] Army, and if the war stops comme
ça, then nothing matters. It was not worth it to be born and to have lived more
than fifty nine years; everything has been pulled apart, the only good thing left is
the family…"32
In the 1940, facing the most destructive war experienced by humankind, Jabotinsky
could no longer sustain  his  omnipotent  image of  a  Cassandra.  But together  with the
collapse of the Cassandra myth, all his perceptions of the self were shaken to their core.
The  family  and  the  familiar  World  War  I  military  paradigm  were  the  only  symbolic
shelters  where Jabotinsky could seek  support  for  his  post-Cassandra  self,  prior to  his
death from a heart attack in August 1940.
31 Jabotinsky, Vladimir to Jabotinsky, Joanna, 27 February 1927, in: Jabotinsky, Ze'ev: Igrot 1926–1926, Jerusalem 2000, p. 144.
Original in Russian.
32 Jabotinsky, Vladimir to Jabotinsky, Joanna, 29 May 1940, in: Jabotinsky Archive at the Jabotinsky Institute in Israel, A1 – 
36/2/12. Original in Russian.
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